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“However clear-headed and well-informed we 
may learn to be, and however confident we may 
become, none of our understandings of politics 
will ever be more than one small voice in dialogue 
with an immense range of other voices. To be 
sure, we can often hear ourselves exceedingly 
well, but that is largely because we are so ill-
placed (and perhaps also in many cases so 
disinclined) to listen accurately to anyone else.” 
(Dunn, 2000, p.4) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In November, the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) 
published, in the 2007 version of their annual South Africa Survey, the 
finding that the number of people living below the $1/day (starvation) 
line had increased from 1.9 million in 1996 to 4.2 million ‘a decade later’. 
Not surprisingly, much of the response to this news was unfavourable. 
One aim of the present paper is to examine a couple of aspects of one of 
the most hostile responses, that of the President in his weekly ‘Letter 
from the President’, (referred to below as Mbeki, 2007). The first of these 
concerns the President’s use of poverty estimates created by Professor 
Servaas van der Berg and his co-workers in the University of 
Stellenbosch.1 The other feature of interest in the Letter, is the aggressive 
way in which the President chooses to dismiss the Race Relations 
findings. 
 
Another aim of the paper is to reflect briefly on the implications for anti-
poverty policy of the President’s (and the ANC’s) ideological stance on 
poverty alleviation, reduction and eradication. Hamstrung by prejudice, 
the ANC (in government and in conference) has foresworn the further use 
of the most effective instrument for poverty alleviation, social grants. For 
a government whose ability to implement and monitor policy is seriously 
hampered by lack of capacity, this rejection of one of the cornerstones of 
social democracy, has serious consequences. Addicted, like all 
governments, to ‘good news’, the ANC government has gone to 
inordinate lengths to ‘get a fix’ (in the form of soothing statistics) that can 
help it to cope with the possibility that its anti-poverty policy is not 
working as it should. One effect of this has been to increase the distance 
between the poor and certain critical parts of the state (most prominently, 
the National Treasury and the Presidency). Those claiming to represent 
the poor exacted their revenge at the recent ANC conference, where many 
(but not all) Mbeki supporters were unceremoniously bundled out of the 
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party’s national executive committee (NEC), or demoted well down its 
ranks.2 Celebration of this outcome would, however, be premature. 
Convenient though it may be to believe it possible to lay all of the blame 
for the frustration of the poor at the feet of the president, the reality is that 
the party is also to blame. Far from increasing the likelihood that the poor 
will benefit materially from the recent shake-up, there is a distinct 
possibility that the space to manoeuvre has shrunk - business is likely to 
resist fiercely any demands for social justice that it chooses to brand as 
‘populist’. 
 
Soothing statistics have emerged chiefly from the Stellenbosch stable of 
Professor Servaas van der Berg and his colleagues, and, to a lesser extent 
from the Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU) in the University of 
Cape Town (Bhorat et al, 2006).3 Scrutiny of the work by van der Berg et 
al reveals that they currently have three sets of estimates of poverty in 
circulation (2005; 2007a and 2007b). Using the same poverty line, the 
results these papers report differ substantially, one from the other. 
According to the van der Berg et al 2005 paper, the poverty headcount, 
using a poverty line of R250 per capita per month, for the year 2004 is 
15.4 million, while the 2007a estimate offers readers a total of 13.1 
million (both sets of estimates report a decline in the poverty headcount 
between 2000-2004 of more than three million). When the 2005 results 
appeared, government was not slow to milk them for their propaganda 
value. At the time of writing, government does not yet seem to have 
capitalised on the new, lower 2007a figures. 
 
The income poverty estimates in government’s Development Indicators 
Mid-Term Review (PCAS, 2007) make use of research by van der Berg 
and his colleagues. A paper they published earlier this year (2007b) 
contains a set of poverty headcount rates whose values for the period up 
until 2004 are identical to the figures in the Review. The decline in the 
headcount reported in the 2007b paper between 2000 and 2004 is 0.9 
million. The 2007b headcounts, which are much larger than those 
reported in the 2005 and 2007a papers, suggest (to the unwary) that the 
headcount was higher in 2006 (20.991 million) than it was in 1993, the 
last year of the apartheid regime (20.002 million). 
 
A reader not familiar with the van der Berg et al oeuvre scratching around 
among the 2007a and 2007b headcount rates is likely to be baffled when 
they discover that the 2007a figures (published earlier than their 2007b 
counterparts) differ quite substantially from the latter. The 2007b figures 
say the headcount rate in 2004 was 46.9 per cent; the 2007a paper says it 
was 36.4 per cent, while the 2005 paper gives it as 41.3 per cent. 
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The 2007b results are, however, not comparable with the 2005 and 2007a 
figures.4 The reason for the non-comparability, tucked away in a footnote 
a couple of pages away from the poverty results, is that unlike the 2005 
and 2007a figures, the 2007b numbers are not adjusted for under-
reporting of income in the surveys on which the estimates are (partly) 
based. Why, given the fuss that van der Berg et al make about the 
misleading nature of unadjusted poverty estimates published by others, 
they should offer government for publication, a set of unadjusted figures, 
and then go ahead and publish (slightly different) unadjusted figures of 
their own, is not clear. At very least, the Review results need a prominent 
warning about why the headcount rates differ from other van der Berg et 
al figures government is fond of quoting. In this regard, as we shall see 
below, the explanatory notes in the Review are inadequate. 
 
Confusion results from the publication of adjusted and unadjusted 
poverty estimates without proper warning to users. Instead of being 
merely confusing, a methodological error at the heart of their 2005 
results, renders the numbers downright misleading. Their 2007a figures, 
by reducing the poverty estimates still further, compound the error (Meth, 
2007b). 
 
The consequences for the poor, of errors in the measurement of poverty 
are potentially serious. It is difficult to see how adequate poverty policy 
can, in the first instance, be formulated, and how it can be adapted to 
changing circumstances if government does not have reliable measures of 
the gravity of the problem. 
 
 
INTO THE FIRE 
 
When Race Relations took the courageous (foolhardy?) decision to 
publish a clearly inflammatory set of figures, they must have felt fairly 
confident that the research results they were citing would stand up to the 
critical scrutiny it was bound to receive. Such confidence is probably 
misplaced. Remarkably, for a country in which poverty alleviation, 
reduction and ultimately, eradication, have been assigned the highest 
priority, the data required for making reliable estimates of income (or 
expenditure) poverty at national and sub-national levels, do not exist. 
Unless Race Relations has discovered a treasure trove not available to the 
rest of us, the researcher whose work they cite will have had to rely on 
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the same tired stuff as we all do - data which may not be able to bear the 
burden Race Relations has placed on them. 
 
This is not to say that the outcome they report could not possibly have 
occurred. Population growth5 (and AIDS) could have brought about an 
increase in the number of households not fortunate enough to have (a) an 
income earner in the household, or outside of the household sending 
remittances, and/or (b) a potential recipient of one of the social grants. If 
high-income countries with long-established comprehensive social 
security systems are capable of registering increases in the numbers in 
poverty, then it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that such a thing 
could happen in South Africa, with its far-from-comprehensive system 
and its mass unemployment. Until, however, Race Relations can 
demonstrate that findings it reports are robust, we would do well to treat 
them with polite scepticism. 
 
Unfortunately, and predictably, this is not the treatment they have 
received. Squabbles over the level and severity of poverty in the country 
are commonplace, a consequence of the aforementioned absence of 
adequate data. The storm that the Race Relations figures unleashed, 
however, gains added fury from the inescapably racialised (and highly 
politicised) atmosphere into which they were released. Any suggestion 
that (aspects of the) conditions of the oppressed masses were better under 
the apartheid regime, strikes a raw nerve, understandably so.6 
 
One can, of course, rely on some nasty conservative to rub salt into the 
wound by adding distasteful commentary to already unpleasant results. 
Here, for example, is Rush Limbaugh, a radio talk-show host (an 
‘infotainer’, sometimes described as a ‘disinfotainer’) reaching mass 
audiences in the US, and others abroad, via his website: 
 
The number of South Africans living on less than one dollar a day has 
more than doubled in a decade since shortly after the end of apartheid. 
The South African Institute of Race Relations said that 4.2 million 
people were living on one dollar a day in 2005. Can I translate this for 
you? Poverty in South Africa has doubled since the ANC took control 
of the country, and the ANC is a Marxist-rooted bunch, a socialist 
bunch. Poverty has doubled, the number of people living on less than a 
dollar a day in South Africa has doubled since the ANC took over.7 
 
Such intemperate nonsense as his ‘translation’ should be treated with the 
contempt it so obviously deserves. Unfortunately even commentators 
accused of being progressive, like dear old Auntie Beeb (the BBC) 
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manage to distort the news. Their otherwise neutral treatment of the 
report ran under the similarly misleading headline ‘Poor S Africans 
double in decade’.8 
 
Given the sensitivity of the issue, Race Relations must have anticipated 
that in the minds of at least some of its audience, it would be deemed to 
be speaking the unspeakable. With exquisitely poor timing, their findings 
appeared at about the same time as President Mbeki had written of the 
need: 
 
‘… to oppose the pernicious tendency in our country of the 
falsification of reality to advance the particular agendas of forces that 
are opposed to our movement and the national democratic revolution.’ 
‘[W]e face’, the President wrote, ‘… a permanent need to chain the 
canards.’ 
 
Amongst the canards (unfounded rumours or stories) to be ‘chained’, said 
he, was: 
 
‘… the absurd assertion that the masses of our people are poorer now 
than they were during the apartheid period’, noting that ‘… in essence, 
the SAIRR repeats this absurd assertion.’ (Mbeki, 2007) 
 
Since most Race Relations publications are available only to subscribers, 
one must first find a subscriber before one can check on whether or not 
the research actually suggests that ‘the masses of our people are poorer 
now than they were during the apartheid period’, or whether the results 
refer only to those at the bottom end of the income distribution.9 
Although the answer to that question is important, the noise the Race 
Relations results have made, has obscured another equally important 
question, namely, what does government think the level of poverty in 
South Africa is, and how has this level changed over time? 
 
 
HOW SEVERE DOES GOVERNMENT THINK 
POVERTY IS IN SOUTH AFRICA? 
 
Here, we are not in the dark at all. The lengthy rebuttal of the Race 
Relations claim in the weekly letter from the President tells us exactly 
what he believes has been achieved. My interest, as I noted above, is in 
two aspects of the letter: (i) the President’s use of what I argue to be 
THE (LAME) DUCK UNCHAINED TRIES TO COUNT THE POOR 6 
 
misleading figures published in the Development Indicators Mid-Term 
Review (PCAS, 2007), and incorrect figures published in van der Berg et 
al (2005), and (ii) the language with which he introduces his objections to 
the Race Relations intervention (of which that cited in the passages above 
is the most extreme). As far as the numbers are concerned, the President 
writes that the Mid-Term Review: 
 
‘… includes a Poverty Headcount Index.’ In this regard it says, ‘This 
index measures the number of people living below a poverty line of 
R3,000 per capita per annum (in 2000 constant Rand). The strong 
decline in the headcount poverty rate (P0) after 2001 is mainly due to 
the expansion of social grants, and more jobs created in the economy.’ 
The percentage of people living below this poverty line declined from 
53.1 percent in 1996 to 43.2 percent in 2006. (Mbeki, 2007) 
 
Originating in work done for the Presidency by Professor Servaas van der 
Berg and his colleagues in the University of Stellenbosch, these figures 
are infected by what I took at first to be an error of transposition. Closer 
inspection reveals, however, that the Mid-Term Review results, as 
published, are a faithful, but poorly signposted reproduction of the 
research from which they are drawn. 
 
On first reading the Mid-Term Review, I was struck by the differences 
between the poverty headcount rates cited above by the President (they 
appear on p.25 of the Review), and the figures in the 2007 van der Berg et 
al paper with which I had been working (let us call that van der Berg et 
al, 2007a). Not being able to lay hands on the work by van der Berg et al 
to which the compilers of the Mid-Term Review, the Policy Coordination 
and Advisory Services (PCAS) in the Presidency, refer, I suggested, 
incorrectly, as it turns out, in the first draft of the present paper, that the 
discrepancy arose because the compilers of the Review had mistakenly 
used results similar to those given for poverty at the R4000 per capita per 
annum line in Figure 17 of the 2005 paper (van der Berg et al, 2005, 
p.39). 
 
On the basis of that assumption, I argued that by reproducing what were 
obviously (to me) suspect figures,10 Race Relations displayed a want of 
critical faculty. An e-mail from Marco MacFarlane at Race Relations, in 
response to the copy of the draft I sent him for comment, shows that the 
truth is much stranger than my poor attempt at explaining the difference. 
Before reproducing in the Race Relations ‘Fast Facts’, the figures that 
appear in the Review, MacFarlane informs me that he took the trouble to 
refer to what he thought was the original source.11 Let us call the latter 
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paper, of whose existence I had previously been unaware, van der Berg et 
al 2007b. 
 
There are startling differences between the poverty estimates in van der 
Berg et al 2007a and those in the 2007b paper. The results are reproduced 
in Table 1 below. The results from their 2005 paper are given as well. 
Beneath the 2007b results, the figures offered in the Mid-Term Review are 
given. With the exception of estimate for the year 2006, it would appear 
that the source of the Review figures is a paper containing similar 
estimates to those that appeared in the 2007b paper.12 
 
Before looking at the figures, we need to ensure that the estimates are 
comparable. Although the discussion in the different papers is a little 
confusing, it would appear that all of the estimates are based on poverty 
lines of R250 per capita per month (R3000 per annum, at 2000 prices). 
This is most clearly articulated in the 2007a paper, where van der Berg et 
al say quite specifically at the head of page 19 that: 
 
The poverty line selected for analysis is R250 monthly per capita 
household income in 2000 value, or R3 000 per annum. 
 
In the 2005 paper, they say: 
 
Here two poverty lines are utilised: a lower one set at R250 household 
income per month or R3 000 per year in 2000 Rand, following Van 
der Berg and Louw (2004), and a higher one set at R281 per month or 
R3 371 household income per year, following Bhorat (2004). (2005, 
p.16) 
 
Fortunately, the reader is rescued from the confusion which the use of the 
term ‘household’ might cause, by a footnote that reads as follows: 
 
Bhorat (2004) bases his poverty line on one used by May, viz. R903 
per month per household in 1995 Rand values. Adjusting for inflation 
and for the average household size of 4.44 found in the 1995 OHS, this 
converts to R3 371 per person per annum in 2000 Rand values. (2005, 
p.16n) 
 
From this one may infer that a poverty line of R250 per capita per month 
in 2000 prices is used to generate one of the sets of 2005 results. As far as 
poverty line selection in the 2007b paper is concerned, the authors simply 
state that: 
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We set the poverty line at R250 per month or R3 000 per year in 2000 
Rand values, in line with our earlier research (Van der Berg & Louw 
2004). (p.20) 
 
This is taken by the PCAS to refer to a per capita line - here is what the 
Review says: 
 
This index measures the number of people living below a poverty line 
of R3 000 per capita per annum (in 2000 constant Rand). (PCAS, 
2007, p.25) 
 
So far, so good - let us halt the consistency check at this point and revert 
to the results in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  Poverty estimates by van der Berg et al and the PCAS 
van der Berg et al, 
2005, p.17 1993 1995 2000 2004  
Headcount ratio (%) 40.6 - 41.3 33.2  
Headcount 16 200 000 - 18 500 000 15 400 000  
      
van der Berg et al, 
2007a, p.19 1993 1995 2000 2004  
Headcount ratio (%) 33.6 33.2 36.4 28.1  
Headcount 13 426 144 13 724 926 16 287 231 13 063 241  
      
van der Berg et al, 
2007b, p.21 1993 1995 2000 2004 2006 
Headcount ratio (%) 50.1 51.7 50.8 46.9 44.4
Headcount 20 002 068 21 397 486 22 704 130 21 785 700 20 990 916
  
PCAS, 2007, p.25 1993 1995 2000 2004 2006 
Headcount ratio (%) 50.1 51.7 50.8 46.9 43.2
 
 
My first thought on working through the figures in the 2007b paper was 
that they were the result of an attempt by van der Berg et al to improve on 
their 2005 estimates of poverty after these were criticised at a workshop 
organised by the HSRC in February 2006.13 
 
 If it had been the case that the 2007b results had been abandoned, to be 
replaced by the 2007a figures, instead of accusing the PCAS of inserting 
the wrong figures into the Review, the finger would have had to point in 
the direction of van der Berg et al. For, if these figures had been 
comparable, as the preliminary examination above suggests (the figures 
all refer to headcount estimates generated by the use of a poverty line of 
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R250 per capita per month in 2000 prices), then there would have been 
some explaining to be done - for the year 2000, the range of the implied 
headcounts for the two estimates made in 2007 is an implausible six and a 
half million, while for the year 2004 it is an incredible 8.7 million. 
 
There is, of course, no explaining to be done, because as was pointed out 
above, the 2005 and 2007a figures are not comparable with the 2007b 
numbers. What does have to be explained, though, is why the guidance 
offered to users is so poor. The 2007b results are presented in graphic 
form on p.20 (Figure 2) of the publication, while the table containing the 
numbers - Foster-Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) estimates for the total 
population and for each of the four race groups - appears on p.21. The 
first clue to the difference between the 2005 and 2007a figures, on the 
one hand, and the 2007b on the other, appears in a footnote on p.18, 
where in a discussion of their estimates of per capita income by race, van 
der Berg et al say that: 
 
Unlike in some earlier work, we do not adjust the data to make it 
compatible to the national accounts data series. The exception is for 
the final two years of the data, where we moderate the somewhat 
excessive growth shown by AMPS by adjusting the growth downward 
so as not to exceed growth rates derived from the national accounts. 
(2007b, p.18n) 
 
The next clue appears in the title of Figure 2―’Poverty headcount rates 
(1993 to 2006) based on AMPS data’ (van der Berg et al, 2007b, p.20). 
By itself, this does not mean much - all of the recent poverty estimates by 
van der Berg et al that I have seen are based on AMPS data - one has to 
guess that this means (mostly) unadjusted AMPS data. This feature of the 
results deserves prominence. 
 
Now the fun starts - by publishing poverty estimates in this way, they are 
asking to be misunderstood, and duly are, as the examples below will 
demonstrate. The work which resulted in the 2007b publication is almost 
certainly a continuation of the work done for the Presidency that made its 
way into the Mid-Term Review. As may be seen in Table 1, with the 
exception of the estimates for 2006, the van der Berg et al 2007b poverty 
rates and the Review rates are identical. In the Review, for ‘Indicator 19 
Poverty Headcount Index’, under the heading ‘Trend analysis’, it says (as 
was noted above) that: 
 
This index measures the number of people living below a poverty line 
of R3 000 per capita per annum (in 2000 constant Rand). 
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‘Number’ should, of course, be ‘proportion of the population’. The 
‘Definition’ in the Review, which reads as follows, gets it correct: 
 
Headcount index (P0), the proportion of the population below the 
poverty line, at a poverty line of R3 000 in 2000 constant Rand. 
 
The ‘Data source’ of the figures is given as: 
 
Van der Berg, et al (2006) based on AMPS of various years (1993 - 
2004). AMPS income is recorded in more than 30 household income 
brackets. Incomes were converted to per capita levels by applying 
household size. Pareto estimates of income were estimated in the open 
interval for each race and household size category. Income was 
assumed to be distributed equally within income brackets. (PCAS, 
2007, p.25) 
 
In the ‘Notes on calculation’, the reader is referred to the notes to Figure 
17. These read as follows: 
 
AMPS income data show very strong growth for 2005 and this income 
level was maintained and even grew in 2006. This is probably more 
the result of better capturing of incomes in the survey rather than of 
real income shifts. To rather err on the side of being conservative 
regarding poverty trends, AMPS incomes for these two years were 
adjusted downwards to give growth rates of income consistent with the 
National Accounts. Without these adjustments, poverty falls by 
another 3 percentage points in these years. These adjustments do not 
affect distribution estimates. Adjustment of AMPS income in 2005: 
Adjusted AMPS 2005 income / Unadjusted AMPS 2004 income = 
National Account 2005 current income / National Account 2004 
current income. Adjustment of AMPS income in 2006: Adjusted 
AMPS 2006 income / Unadjusted AMPS 2004 income = National 
Account 2006 current income / National Account 2004 current 
income. (PCAS, 2007, p.23) 
 
Unless one is thoroughly familiar with the van der Berg et al poverty 
work, one cannot possibly ascertain from this information, the fact that 
the poverty headcount rates in the Review are based on data that have not 
been adjusted to account for under-reporting. So, when an innocent user 
approaches the numbers and attempts to convert the Review headcount 
rates into headcounts (as Race Relations did in their response to the 
President), there is a good chance of their being confused by the end-
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result. It is not obvious that the President himself is aware that the rates 
he cited, which, to the poverty researcher, are on the high side, are 
unadjusted headcount rates. The question thus arises, why did the 
Presidency choose to publish these figures, and not the adjusted numbers 
that van der Berg et al put forward as the reality of poverty in South 
Africa? 
 
As I noted above, it was obvious, on a first reading of the Review that 
there was something ‘wrong’ with the figures. My initial (and incorrect) 
speculation was that the PCAS may simply have used the figures 
generated by a higher poverty line. Having been made aware of the 2007b 
figures and having not noticed the critical footnote, the next stage of the 
wild goose chase involved trying to work out from the timing of the 
publications, which of the two sets of results, the 2007a or the 2007b, 
could be regarded as authoritative. 
 
That enterprise generated the following history: The 2005 paper was 
superceded by the slightly modified paper referred to as van der Berg et 
al (2006). The 2007a paper replaces the 2006 paper. Although they 
present unadjusted poverty rates for purposes of showing that doing so 
leaves their ‘conclusions … largely unchanged’ (van der Berg et al, 
2007a, p.10), the main results in the 2005, 2006 and 2007a papers are 
adjusted to compensate for under-reporting of incomes in the surveys 
from which the basic data are drawn. In the van der Berg et al 2007a 
results, all three FGT poverty measures are lower than their counterparts 
in the 2005 and 2006 papers. 
 
The Review does not have a month of publication on it, but the pdf file 
containing the Review I downloaded from the government website is 
dated 1st August 2007. The publication date of the van der Berg et al 
2007b paper is given as August 2007. Its pdf file is dated 29th July 2007, 
and it was modified on 12th September 2007. The .pdf file for the van der 
Berg et al 2007a paper (which does not have on it, a month of 
publication) is dated 30th April 2007.14 Before tumbling to the now 
obvious explanation (obvious because of the amount of time I have spent 
scratching around in the figures), the timing of the publication of the two 
papers suggested (implausibly) that when the Review went to press, 
although both its compilers and the suppliers of the poverty information 
thought that the 2007b figures (or something like them) were the correct 
ones, van der Berg et al had somehow omitted to bring to the attention of 
the Review’s compilers, the existence of the 2007a results, published, as 
we see above, in April 2007. Why, I asked myself, when the more 
favourable 2007a results were available quite a while before the Review 
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was published, would the Presidency choose to use the inferior set of 
results? Other than the fact they record a hefty decline in the poverty rate, 
the 2007b figures do not have a great deal to recommend them. In the 
President’s response to Race Relations, shortly after he had made 
reference to this fall by saying that: 
 
The percentage of people living below this poverty line declined from 
53.1 percent in 1996 to 43.2 percent in 2006. 
 
he cites the use (by Dr Gumede of the Presidency), of results from 
another study by van der Berg et al, to ward off an earlier Race Relations 
‘onslaught’. The passage reads as follows: 
 
Utilising a lower poverty line set at R250 household income per month 
or R3,000 per year in 2000 Rands, they conclude that in more recent 
years, the proportion of people living in poverty appears to have 
declined substantially – from 18.5-million in 2000 to 15.4-million in 
2004. 
 
Once past the confusion over whether the poverty line applies to 
households or individuals (it is the latter), digging into the two sets of 
numbers discloses the differences discussed above, namely, that one set is 
adjusted for under-reporting of income, while the other is not. The 
President’s advisors should have made him aware of the difference. 
 
The numbers cited by Dr Gumede are obviously adjusted for under-
reporting of income.15 Figures for corresponding years from the 
unadjusted Review estimates give poverty headcount rates (proportions of 
the population in poverty), that imply headcounts (numbers of people in 
poverty) of 22.7 million in 2000, and 21.8 million in 2004. Thus, 
according to the President’s sources, either the poverty headcount in 2004 
was 21.8 million, and it fell over the period 2000-2004 by 0.9 million, or 
it was 15.4 million in 2004, having fallen by 3.1 million between 2000 
and 2004. 
 
The question posed above of why, when they insist that other unadjusted 
rates are incorrect, van der Berg et al allow their own to be published 
without adequate warning, is one to which an answer is required. The 
potential for confusion to which their publication gives rise, is, as we 
have seen above, high - but wait, it becomes even worse. 
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 PRESIDENCY SAYS THINGS WERE BETTER UNDER 
APARTHEID? 
 
The Review does not give headcounts, but if it had done so, and if it used 
the same population series as is used by van der Berg et al (2007b), a set 
of results something like that given below in Table 2 would have 
emerged. There are two headcounts for 2006; the first of them, obtained 
using the headcount ratio in the Mid-Term Review, the second of them is 
given (with spurious precision) as 20 990 916 in van der Berg et al, 
2007b, p.21. 
 
Table 2  Poverty headcounts using unadjusted headcount ratios 
Year Poverty headcount ratio (%) Poverty headcount (millions) 
1993 50.1 20.0 
1994 50.5 20.5 
1995 51.7 21.4 
2000 50.8 22.7 
2004 46.9 21.8 
2006 43.2 20.4 
2006* 44.4 21.0 
Source: Headcount ratios: 1993-2006, PCAS, 2007, p.25. 2006*, van der Berg 
et al, 2007b, p.21. 
Headcounts: 1993, 1995, 2000, 2004 and 2006* are from van der Berg et al, 
2007b, p.21. 
Notes: The 1994 poverty headcount is obtained by applying the 50.5 per cent 
poverty headcount ratio from the Review to a population estimate obtained by 
interpolation from the implied populations for 1993 and 1995 in van der Berg 
et al, 2007, p.21. The 2006 headcount is obtained by applying the Review 
headcount rate to the 2006 population implied in van der Berg et al, 2007b. 
 
 
If the figures in Table 2 are to be believed, although the headcount ratio 
fell after reaching a peak of 53.1 in 1996, the answer to the question of 
what happened to the headcount between 1994 and 2006, depends on 
which of the 2006 values is held to be authoritative. The Review figure 
(based on work done by van der Berg et al in 2006) records a tiny 
decline, while the van der Berg et al (2007b) figures register a small 
increase. Suspend disbelief a little longer, and imagine that these changes 
are statistically significant. The conclusion then would be that taking the 
period of democracy as a whole, income poverty fell ever so slightly, or 
rose marginally. It would not of course, be reasonable to overlook the fall 
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between 2000 and 2006, during which period social grants (and some job 
creation) start to drive the poverty rate downwards. Nevertheless, by one 
measure, one could say that income poverty was worse in 2006 than it 
was in 1994. As Kanbur (2004) has noted, when such an outcome occurs, 
the ‘hard’ question arises as to whether or not it should be regarded as a 
lessening in the severity of poverty arises. There is no simple answer to 
this question. 
 
The foregoing exercise is a legitimate use of the results published in the 
Mid-Term Review, the Foreword to the which, reads as follows: 
 
In the Ten Year Review done towards the end of the First Decade of 
Freedom, government emphasised the need for better monitoring and 
evaluation of the implementation of its programmes. Monitoring and 
evaluation is the life-blood of sound and efficient planning and 
implementation. For it to add value to government work and to the 
broader process of social transformation, it should be based on 
objective measurements that reflect the ideals in our Constitution: to 
improve the quality of life of all South Africans and ensure that South 
Africa contributes to the creation of a better Africa and a better world. 
 
After a brief description of the 72 indicators presented, one which refers 
to their ‘being informed by international good practice adapted to South 
African conditions’, the Foreword is concluded with the following 
statement: 
 
We do hope that South Africans will examine the data against the 
backdrop of their lived experience and research work conducted 
independently of government. This will help enrich public discourse 
on who we are and where we are going as a nation. It will also lay the 
basis for national consensus on how we should measure the progress 
we are making towards a better life for all. (PCAS, 2007, p.2) 
 
Naïve readers of the Review (all those who do not know about the strong 
arguments van der Berg et al advance against the use of unadjusted 
poverty estimates) must draw the conclusions spelled out above - the 
figures in the table do not tell any other story other than one that says that 
although the headcount ratio was quite a bit lower in 2006 than it was in 
2000, conditions for some very large number of people, as measured by 
the admittedly limited indicator, income poverty, were about the same as 
they were in the year the ANC came to power, and slightly worse than in 
the last year of the apartheid regime. That the conclusion is almost 
certainly not true is not the issue - what is at stake here is the fact that 
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official figures allow one to draw that conclusion.16 As noted earlier, the 
President’s response to Race Relations spoke of the continuing need to 
counter: 
 
‘… the absurd assertion that the masses of our people are poorer now 
than they were during the apartheid period’, noting that ‘… in essence, 
the SAIRR repeats this absurd assertion.’ (Mbeki, 2007) 
 
Yet as is demonstrated above, according to figures put out by the 
Presidency, not only are the Race Relations figures not so absurd, by one 
measure, ‘the masses of our people [about 21 million of them], were 
poorer [in 2006] than they were during the apartheid period’. That such a 
tale can be told (with a straight face) is only possible for the reason 
already given above, namely, that the data required for making reliable 
estimates of income poverty do not exist. This means that even after 
poverty has been conceptualised, defined and measured in ways that find 
general acceptance, disagreements over poverty’s history in South Africa 
will continue. 
 
Sorting out the confusion described above is relatively easy - if the PCAS 
insists on allowing the published unadjusted results to stand, they should 
(i) furnish explanatory notes of such clarity in an erratum sheet to the 
Mid-Term Review that readers are not tempted to draw the ‘wrong’ 
conclusions if they carry out an exercise like that above,17 and (ii) in the 
same sheet, explain to readers (if they can) why it is useful for a set of 
unadjusted estimates to be made available. 
 
So much for that part of the story - of greater consequence, is the strong 
likelihood that the adjusted figures are troubled by serious 
methodological problems. 
 
 
WHY DO RESEARCHERS PRODUCE DIFFERENT 
ESTIMATES OF POVERTY? 
 
In the first draft of the present paper, I drew attention to what I described 
as another possible infection, the differences between the van der Berg et 
al estimates and my own (Meth, 2006a). My estimates and their 2005 (or 
2006) figures differ substantially - the 2007a piece makes a big 
divergence, bigger still. The relevant figures are given in Table 3. Before 
going any further, let it be known that when I say the headcount in 2004 
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was 18.2 million, I am actually saying that I think it possibly lies in the 
region of 17-19 million - with existing data sources, more precise than 
that it is difficult to be. Something similar must hold for the van der Berg 
et al figures (their invocation of the label ‘robust’ notwithstanding). As 
may be seen, our respective headcounts in 2004 differed at first by about 
three million (their 2005 paper and my 2006a paper). Their 2007a effort 
makes the headcount in 2004 about five million lower than my estimate. 
 
Our respective estimates of the reduction in poverty over the period 2000-
2004 differ by a substantial couple of million. By their reckoning the 
poverty headcount fell by about three million: by mine, about 1.2 
million.18 Evidence from the van der Berg et al stable that poverty had 
been reduced, either by job or income growth is unconvincing - my 
conclusion is that the reduction in the headcount that occurred, did so 
almost entirely because of the expansion of the social grant system (Meth, 
2006a, p.50). Despite some fraud, the grants are well targeted - so there 
seems little doubt that the intensity of poverty fell. Obviously, it is crucial 
not to overstate this effect. 
 
Table 3  Competing income poverty estimates, 2000/2001 and 2004 
Source Year 
 
Headcount 
Headcount 
ratio (P0) 
Poverty gap 
ratio (P1) 
van der Berg et al (2005) 2000 18 500 000 0.413 0.205 
 2004 15 400 000 0.332 0.146 
     
van der Berg et al (2007a) 2000 16 300 000 0.364 0.163 
 2004 13 100 000 0.281 0.113 
     
Meth, 2006a 2001 19 400 000 0.433 - 
 2004 18 200 000 0.399 0.227 
Sources: van der Berg et al (2005, Table 2, p.17); (2007a, Table 2, p.19). Meth 
(2006a, Table 6, p.31 and Table 8, p.37) 
Note: The poverty line (z) is equal to R250 per capita per month in 2000 prices. 
 
 
The explanation of why our figures differ so greatly appears to lie in the 
way we compensate for the under-reporting that plagues all household 
survey estimates of income (and, possibly to a lesser extent, of 
expenditure as well). Let us look at the problem. 
 
Different researchers, sometimes using the same data sets, can arrive at 
different conclusions about the severity of poverty. Some of this can be 
accounted for by the differences in the ways they adjust the raw data they 
use, for the various weaknesses to which it is prone. As everyone knows 
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who works with household survey data,19 income is usually under-
reported. The extent of under-reporting at different points in the income 
distribution cannot be determined. To compensate for under-reporting of 
income, a simple, but contentious correction is sometimes made, in which 
survey total incomes are adjusted until they equal national accounts 
income estimates. In the variant of this approach used by van der Berg et 
al, racial mean incomes are estimated from the national accounts and the 
household (AMPS) surveys, and the latter are adjusted upwards. Because 
the degree of under-reporting by income level cannot be ascertained, 
incomes across the distributions (by race) are adjusted upwards by the 
proportions emerging from the comparison between national accounts 
and survey means. Since the values of social grants are known with 
precision, knowing that a household receives one or more grants allows 
income from that source to be valued with precision - the adjustment 
should thus be carried out only on earned incomes (especially 
remuneration). 
 
In my work, the intention was to see what effect a broadly similar 
approach, using Statistics South Africa data sets, would have on poverty 
estimates. My approach differs from theirs in that I do not estimate racial 
incomes, but rather rely on the data to furnish estimates of remuneration, 
and counts of the social grants going into the various households.20 
 
Although puzzled by the large difference between the van der Berg et al 
(2005) results and my own figures, I originally did not bother to search 
too deeply for an explanation. With the publication of their 2007a paper, 
however, the discrepancy became too large to ignore. In a paper 
published recently by the Southern African Labour and Development 
Research Unit (SALDRU) in the University of Cape Town (Meth, 
2007b), I offer a detailed explanation of why I think they are wrong. The 
short version is this - the definition of income in the survey data they use 
apparently does not allow them to identify earned income (mainly 
remuneration), as opposed to income from other sources (like grants). In 
their 2005 paper, they thus appear to over-correct for under-reporting 
among low-income households, the bulk of whose income is in the form 
of grants. The 2007a estimates presumably suffer from the same problem, 
but to an even more marked extent.21 
 
Although innovative, the method used to generate the results, if my 
understanding of the AMPS questionnaires is correct, is seriously flawed. 
That being so, the figures should not have been allowed out of the blocks 
until such time as peer review gave the signal for the starting gun to be 
fired. Research results that are wrong by some significant margin, if they 
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exert undue influence on policy formation, could harm the poor. In 
sensitive areas, the mere possibility of this occurring should be sufficient 
to put researchers on guard against the dangers of allowing fragile 
findings to become the received wisdom. In the hurly-burly of politics, 
caveats are all too easily washed away. When, instead of caveats, readers 
are offered the repeated reassurance of the term ‘robust’, as they are in 
both the 2005 and 2007a van der Berg et al papers, there is little to stop 
policymakers reaching out for the comfort their findings bring. 
 
 
FALSIFYING REALITY 
 
And so to the language used by the President as preface to his attempt to 
set the record on poverty straight (in his words, to chain the canard), and 
in particular, to the memorable phrase ‘falsification of reality to advance 
a particular agenda’.22 
 
A fashionable reaction, when unflattering estimates of income poverty 
make their appearance, as they do from time to time, from those 
responsible for anti-poverty policy, is to take cover behind a straw person 
(probably a straw-man) who says that those who continue to estimate 
income poverty are missing the bigger picture (government expenditure 
on assets and services). This diversionary tactic will not work - 
everybody accepts poverty’s multi-dimensional nature, as readily as they 
acknowledge the fact that the lives of millions have been improved by the 
provision of assets and services. That does not, however, render the 
business of estimating income poverty invalid - if one is too poor to 
purchase those necessities not provided free of charge or at subsidised 
prices by the state, one is in poverty. 
 
It should be clear from what has gone before, that as far as income 
poverty is concerned, nobody can talk convincingly about ‘the 
falsification of reality’- there is no privileged access to knowledge of 
what the reality of poverty is. There have been advances in some areas of 
poverty studies in South Africa, but in other respects, as the catalogue of 
conflicting estimates displayed above has revealed, the discipline is not in 
particularly good health. 
 
The origins of the differences between Race Relations and the President 
over the severity of poverty, like that between myself and van der Berg 
and his colleagues, are to be found in the aforementioned non-existence 
of suitable data sets (and, to a lesser extent, in the absence of an agreed 
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poverty line). Even after poverty has been conceptualised, defined and 
measured in a way that finds general acceptance,23 disagreements of this 
sort will (and should) continue. They will persist because it is never going 
to be possible to arrive at a consensus about the history of the progress (or 
the lack thereof) in the struggle against poverty in South Africa. 
 
To talk, under these circumstances, of ‘falsification of reality to advance a 
particular agenda’ is inappropriate. If the charge is intended to apply to 
Race Relations and/or the researcher responsible for the disputed poverty 
estimates, it is not to be taken lightly, for it would impute to them, the 
ulterior motive of fostering (unspecified) ‘counter-revolutionary’ 
activities. Is this what Race Relations was doing? What agenda is 
advanced by making dubious poverty estimates public? 
 
Three come readily to mind - doubtless there are others. The first of them 
(which is probably better described as a self-defeating exercise in futility, 
rather than an ‘agenda’) is the wish, on the part of what one hopes are a 
few, malevolent, racist white South Africans, that government fails, 
simply because this would confirm their prejudice that a black 
government was bound to fail, views which they hold even though the 
personal cost of such failure to these pathetic creatures (and everybody 
else) would be high. Such thinking is an abomination, and hardly what 
one would expect of Race Relations. 
 
More significant, probably, is a desire to spread ‘alarm and 
despondency’.24 As far as the capitalist class is concerned, unless the poor 
are perceived as a threat to profitability, they are likely to constitute 
merely one element in the calculations of risk that have to be made every 
day. It is possible that the poor could be harmed if some jaundiced 
potential investor with a ten-second attention span is persuaded not to 
invest. In the main, though, when news (propaganda) about job growth, 
poverty reduction and the expansion of the middle class is mostly 
favourable, one would not expect the average risk analyst to be 
influenced greatly by the news that there were a few more people (about 
1.3 million) at the very bottom of the heap. This is a testable hypothesis - 
instead of crying foul, why does government not commission market 
research to test it? 
 
A third agenda, that of providing ammunition to other contenders for 
President Mbeki’s job, is suggested in the piece by Frans Cronje of Race 
Relations that was posted to the Business Day web on 28th November 
2007. In an article headed ‘Joblessness in SA and the poverty 
‘consensus’, he said: 
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As for the charge that we are undermining the national democratic 
revolution, I suggest that those making the charge look closer to home, 
where they will notice that the national democratic revolution is very 
much alive, is likely to escalate over the next two weeks and may even 
topple them before the year is out. If they are toppled, I suggest that 
they take the time to reflect that the man who toppled them did so on 
the aspirations of SA’s poor and its working classes. The irony will 
surely not be lost on them that among those who unseated them was a 
group whose very existence they vociferously denied right up and until 
the moment they were unseated. 
 
One could read the ‘falsification of reality’ claim as a suggestion that by 
publishing results that reinforce the arguments made by ‘the man’, Race 
Relations was knowingly contributing to his campaign. Although this 
seems unlikely, stranger things have happened. Speculation on this head 
is idle - unless Race Relations came out and acknowledged that this 
indeed was what they were doing, the matter can never be resolved one 
way or another. The prediction offered in the passage above, has, of 
course, come to pass - more’s the pity that we are unlikely to hear from 
the President’s own lips, an acknowledgement of how wrong he was to 
take refuge in the comfort of research which repeatedly told him how 
well his government was faring in the struggle against poverty, when the 
poor were saying something quite different. 
 
Race Relations can speak for itself (as it already has). My agenda is to 
interpret survey material critically. My wish is that the poor be relieved of 
the burden of their poverty, as quickly as possible, a sentiment I share 
with most others in South Africa. Unlike government, I have no 
responsibility for designing and implementing policies to achieve this. 
Like all commentators, biases could cloud my judgement of both the 
design and implementation of policy. In my case, the earnest wish for 
anti-poverty policies to succeed is counterbalanced by a desire to 
ascertain (insofar as I am able) that the wellbeing of the poor is not 
exaggerated by those with an often compelling need to do so. Like many 
analysts (including the Minister of Social Development),25 I do not 
believe that the current policy mix can solve the poverty problem in an 
acceptable time period. I am not so vain, however, as to wish at all costs 
to be proven right - the slight discomfort of being wrong (economists do 
it all the time) is not to be spoken of in the same breath as the wellbeing 
of millions. In sum, therefore, the vector of the opposing forces acting on 
my perceptions (some the result of childhood poverty), is, I hope, 
tolerable neutrality, at least with respect to reported outcomes. 
THE (LAME) DUCK UNCHAINED TRIES TO COUNT THE POOR 21 
 
 
Government is subject to similar forces, except that where personal vanity 
might drive some individuals to accentuate the negative, government is 
under real and sustained pressure to show that its policies are succeeding. 
It therefore has an urgent need for ‘sufficient’ good news. What 
constitutes ‘sufficient’ is not readily determined, but sure it is that like 
governments everywhere, the South African government over-reacts time 
and again to criticism, positive or negative. Responses to poverty 
estimates, both those that are, and those that are not to government’s 
liking (slavish, uncritical reproduction, and heavy-handed rejection, 
respectively), are not encouraging. The consequences of blindness caused 
by a seductive siren song of rapidly falling poverty, if the fall is not really 
occurring, are too horrible to contemplate. 
 
Chaining the ducks 
And now, a word on ducks that need to be chained - at one level, the 
President’s choice of metaphor is impeccable - as noted above, ‘canard’ is 
‘an unfounded rumour or story’ (Oxford English Dictionary). The need to 
shackle such beasts is self-evident. Rattling in the recesses of my memory 
was a suspicion, however, that there was more to the chained duck story 
than that. As usual, Wikipedia may be relied upon to jog the grey matter - 
here is part of what it has to say about the subject: 
 
[The] name itself is a reference to Radical Georges Clemenceau’s 
newspaper L'homme libre (‘The Free Man’) which was forced to close 
by government censorship and reacted by changing its name to 
L'homme enchaîné (‘The Chained-up Man’); Le Canard enchaîné 
means “The chained-up duck”, but canard (duck) is also French slang 
for “newspaper”. 
 
One takes it for granted that the President is not suggesting (as well), that 
there is a need to chain-up the slang ducks (newspapers). His use, 
however, of the metaphor in a context in which the significance of Race 
Relations stuff on poverty depends, in part, on media exposure, has the 
unfortunate (no doubt, unintentional) connotation outlined in the 
Wikipedia entry cited above, that of a government wishing to censor 
critics. It is not for nothing that good poets choose their words (and 
metaphors) carefully. 
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WE TOLD YOU SO - NOW LOOK WHAT YOU’VE GONE 
AND DONE! 
 
Paradoxically, a reluctance to consider the likelihood that government 
policies to counter poverty may be less successful than the work of van 
der Berg et al suggests, coupled with an unwillingness to approach the 
question of anti-poverty policy formation with an open mind, have 
conspired to diminish the chances of designing and implementing 
effective policy in the future. 
 
While able to do so from a position of strength (i.e., before he became a 
lame duck), President Mbeki might have been capable of doing the only 
thing that in the short- to medium-term will alleviate the poverty of most 
of the able-bodied unemployed poor, namely, extending the social grant 
system to cover them. Instead, he chose to listen to those who told him 
that (a) poverty was falling rapidly, and (b) jobs would come fast enough 
to provide ‘off-ramps’ (or whatever other silly term is currently in vogue) 
out of poverty for the remainder. 
 
One consequence of the handover of the initiative to the self-styled 
‘simple man from Nkandla’ is that the space for sensible analysis of the 
problem of poverty will shrink. Zuma may be more aware of the dreadful 
conditions of the poor than Mbeki, but that does not mean that he has 
anything more to offer them, indeed, he probably has less, because the 
moment he ventures away from the tried, trusted and, in many respects, 
unsuccessful anti-poverty policies of the ANC, the conservative media 
will do its best to thwart what it sees as ‘populist’. 
 
It has already started: an article that ran in several papers on 18th 
December 2007 under the headline ‘Zuma victory could make markets 
edgy’ (I picked it up in the Pretoria News) wheeled out a group of 
economists upon whose pro-business stance, reliance can usually be 
placed. Here, for example, is Mike Schussler of T-Sec: 
 
I think if the economic policies are going to be a step backward 
towards the left then the market response would be reasonable 
negative. This would lead to a weaker rand and higher interest rates. 
 
If, as seems likely, adequate grant-based social protection falls into the 
category of a ‘backward step’ (a standard conservative ideological 
stance), then the poor are in for a rough ride. 
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Having speculated, in the same article, on the contribution of the Zuma 
factor to edginess in the ‘market’ (small), Dawie Roodt of the Efficient 
investment group said: 
 
I don’t know what Zuma stands for, I don’t know what his economic 
beliefs are because he has never said anything. 
 
He owes Cosatu (the Congress of SA Trade Unions) a lot and I know 
what Cosatu stands for and I don’t like that. 
 
Commenting on the unlikelihood of a Zuma presidency being able to 
change the country’s economic course,26 Roodt said that: 
 
The South African economy is very small and very integrated with the 
rest of the world. In South Africa the official opposition is not the 
Democratic Alliance, it’s the financial markets. 
 
If, instead of withdrawing into a comfortable world where denial reigns 
supreme, President Mbeki had had the gumption to acknowledge that the 
ANC’s existing anti-poverty policies are performing poorly, he could 
possibly have traded on his perceived pro-business stance in an effort to 
persuade ‘the opposition’ that social grants are the only way to tackle the 
destitution of millions of South Africans. In this endeavour, he could 
have relied on the support of the parliamentary opposition – the DA has 
on many occasions voiced its support for a basic income grant (however 
mean their understanding of the concept). 
 
Before being unhorsed by the poor, an event welcomed by many as a sign 
that remote, autocratic leaders will not be tolerated, President Mbeki had 
been given ample warning that the numerous poor were cross. They were 
protesting not so much at (or not merely about) poor service delivery, but 
as Steven Friedman has pointed out, at the fact that government did not 
listen to them (Mail & Guardian online, 10th September 2007). 
 
Nor has government proved to be very good at listening to well-placed 
internal critics. Towards the end of 2006, the Minister of Social 
Development, Zola Skweyiya, was muzzled by a cabinet dominated 
(cowed?) by the President, after he ‘came out in support of a basic 
income grant’ (‘Skweyiya calls for basic income grant’, Mail & Guardian 
online, 10th November 2006).27 In the ensuing furore, he stuck to his guns 
(‘Skweyiya sticks by his call for basic income grant’, Donwald Pressly, 
Mail & Guardian online, 20th November 2006). Rejection of Minister 
Skweyiya’s call is reported in an article, also by Donwald Pressly, under 
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the heading ‘Cabinet pours cold water on basic income grant’ that 
appeared in the Mail & Guardian online on 7th December 2006. 
 
Despite repeated references to the need to address poverty, President 
Mbeki has, at times, come across as being both out of touch and 
unsympathetic. One Marie Antoinette moment (he may have had others) 
engraved on my mind was the occasion when he was reported to have 
said of the demand for a Basic Income Grant (BIG), that: 
 
If you give everybody a R100 a month (sic) it will not make a 
difference. The notion that one single intervention will help is wrong. 
To introduce a system which indiscriminately gives R100 to a 
millionaire and a pensioner does not work. (Weekly Mail and 
Guardian, August 1 to 7 2003, p.6) 
 
Although Mbeki’s detractors may find it comforting to pin the lack of 
concern for the poor evident in this crass comment, on the shoulders of a 
single powerful individual, the sad truth is likely to be that he was 
articulating the view of a significant majority among the ANC elite. The 
previous year, under the headline ‘Didiza cautious about basic income 
grant’, a Business Day article had the following to say: 
 
“A basic income grant to the poor should be carefully considered”, 
said Agriculture and Land Affairs Minister Thoko Didiza yesterday. 
“The possibility of such a grant creating dependency should be taken 
into account”, she said. “This discussion at the moment is about the 
values underpinning such a grant”. Didiza was speaking at the release 
of discussion papers for the 51st national conference of the African 
National Congress (ANC). She heads the party’s social transformation 
department. Didiza said discussions about a basic grant as part of a 
social safety net should not be conducted in isolation. “It must be 
looked at within the context of other interventions by government to 
help the poor.” This included free health care for pregnant women and 
children under the age of six. A basic income grant could be linked 
with public works projects that provided the jobless with temporary 
employment. This would help prevent the grant from being a mere 
hand-out, Didiza said. The discussion paper said the ANC believed the 
state’s role should be to enable people to help themselves. For those 
unable to do so because of old age or health problems, there should be 
a social security system. The paper said the ANC should concern itself 
with two strategic objectives making sure that existing social grants 
reached their target and improving the provision of services. “We must 
make sure that all departments who have antipoverty programmes, 
THE (LAME) DUCK UNCHAINED TRIES TO COUNT THE POOR 25 
 
deliver them timeously and efficiently,” the paper said. (Business Day, 
Wednesday 14 August 2002, p.2) 
 
Here, laid out before us, is an admirably brief summary of the ANC’s 
approach to social protection. Social grants, while appropriate for certain 
deserving categories of individuals, are not, on pain of ‘creating 
dependency’, to be extended to the able-bodied poor. My response to it at 
the time (Meth, 2004) was to dismiss the ‘dependency’ spectre as self-
serving cant, setting out in the paper the well-known reasons why, when 
poorly-designed social policy creates perverse incentives, people act 
rationally in taking advantage of them. 
 
Instead of focusing purely on individuals as rational economic actors, 
responding to various incentive ‘menus’, I should have paid more 
attention to the deep irrationality that so often lies at the heart of policy 
design (Dunn, 2000). The key to this irrationality in the passage cited 
immediately above, is to be found in the phrase ‘the values underpinning 
such a grant’. What are these values? Answering that question is not easy 
- as Dunn points out: 
 
Most political understanding consists not in direct insight into values, 
but in assessment of causality: of how existing circumstances came 
about, of what leads to what and what prevents what in politics. (2000, 
p.106) 
 
Assessing causality promises to be a less daunting task. Even so, in the 
process, certain sensitivities will be trampled on, because a critical 
examination of how a party comes to hold certain views has to confront 
the tension between ‘democratic and aristocratic elements in political 
understanding.’ Striding into this minefield, Dunn notes that: 
 
The very idea of attempting to understand something which is 
recognized to be hard to grasp has pronounced aristocratic elements. 
But any interpretation of democracy as a political value which 
repudiates the need to understand what is hard to grasp (what many at 
any given time have palpably failed to grasp) will preclude any 
coherent understanding of interests, and make it exceedingly unlikely 
that the democrats in question do in fact grasp their own interests with 
any accuracy. (Dunn, 2000, p.105) 
 
My suspicion (and it is little more than a suspicion at the moment), after 
talking to a few well-placed members of the ANC, is that for many of 
those who have made it to the top, the combination of the scars of the 
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apartheid experience, and their own success in surmounting the 
monumental obstacles that characterised this system of oppression, has 
caused them to elevate ‘self-reliance’ and an abhorrence of ‘dependence’ 
to mythical status. These ‘values’ have been imposed by some means (the 
party’s ‘democratic’ structures?) on the poor, for it is simply unthinkable 
that poor people would reject such an obvious source of succour as a no-
strings-attached social grant, which, even if it is not large enough to lift 
them out of poverty, would at least save them from destitution. In the 
words of the cliché, this would be an example of turkeys voting in favour 
of Christmas. 
 
Whatever the means used to impose upon people, the process was 
repeated at the ANC National Policy Conference in June 2007. Among 
the ‘beliefs’ expressed in the preamble to the Draft Resolutions in the 
document issued after that conference, is the following: 
 
We are building a developmental state and not a welfare state given 
that in welfare state, (sic) dependency is profound. (ANC, 2007, 
paragraph 36, p.13) 
 
Not a shred of evidence in any ANC document I have ever seen supports 
this extraordinary assertion. Be that as it may, it is followed, in paragraph 
37 by the statement that: 
 
Our attack on poverty must seek to empower people to take 
themselves out of poverty, while creating adequate social nets to 
protect the most vulnerable in our society. 
 
Although ‘safety net’ (residual) social protection systems of the sort 
implied here are less desirable than social democratic welfare regimes 
(Goodin et al, 1999 [2001]), if people could be ‘empowered’ sufficiently 
quickly, then the policy approach, whilst not meeting the criteria laid 
down by committed social democrats, might still be acceptable to the 
populace at large. 
 
There are two ways, and two ways only in which people can be 
empowered out of poverty - ‘decent’ jobs (or jobs which serve as entry 
ports to those sections of the labour market characterised by decent work) 
become available, and the able-bodied unemployed poor are capable of 
taking up those jobs, or, people are able to start, and succeed in running 
small enterprises. This is not the place to engage in detailed analysis of 
the time required, at various growth rates for economic growth to ‘rescue’ 
the poor by one or other of these two methods, 28 suffice it to say that a 
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small speculation conducted on the back of an envelope is all it takes to 
show that it cannot happen fast enough. 
 
Over the past few years, the economy has, on average, created about 
400 000 jobs a year (Meth, 2007; 2008). Suppose that half of those go to 
poor people (see Table 4 on p.26 in Meth, 2008). In 2004, there were 
about 20-21 million people in households where earned income was less 
than twice the very low poverty line of R250 per capita per month in 
2000 prices. These households contained about 2.2 million unemployed, 
according to the official definition, or about 4.8 million unemployed, 
according to the expanded definition (Meth, 2006a, Table 11, p.46). At 
the present rate of labour absorption of the poor unemployed, it would 
take an unconscionably long 24 years to eradicate poverty by 
employment creation, assuming that the jobs created are ‘decent’, in the 
sense in which the ILO (2004) uses the term. Unless job creation rates 
accelerate, therefore, we can expect the problem of poverty associated 
with unemployment to be with us for the foreseeable future. 
 
Prudent politicians (like the Minister of Social Development) would 
interrogate crude estimates like the one made above, and if it were found 
to approximate a possible outcome of the current policy regime, would 
agitate for a reappraisal of that regime. Instead of a serious confrontation 
with possible outcomes of current policies, what we are treated to instead 
is an intensification of the propaganda around (a) implementation of these 
policies, and (b) the repeated assertion of the need for self-reliance in the 
struggle against poverty. Nobody doubts that self-reliance is a desirable 
quality, but its fetishisation is a double insult to the poor. In the first 
place, opportunities for them to escape poverty, for a variety of complex 
reasons, through employment (self, or otherwise) are comparatively rare. 
In the second place, implicit in the constant harping on about dependency, 
is the reduction of the poor to the status of victims whose inability to 
extract themselves from poverty (lack of self-reliance, proneness to 
dependency) would be exacerbated by social grants (often referred to 
pejoratively in ruling circles as ‘handouts’). 
 
By consulting the relevant documents, it is possible to piece together an 
‘official’ story about how the ANC’s anti-poverty policies are created - it 
will be a bottom-up tale in which the ordinary members, through their 
branches, are responsible. We know, however, that in the case of certain 
critical initiatives, GEAR being the most striking example, that there is 
little, if any democratic involvement.29 It is high time that the ANC’s 
anti-poverty policies were subjected to an examination, similar in 
harshness to that which GEAR has received. Present policies smack 
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heavily of the paternalism of the elite. It is far from clear that Zuma, 
supposing he manages to escape conviction in his forthcoming trial, will 
behave very differently from Mbeki. 
 
What Zuma has had so far to say about policies to address poverty and 
unemployment is facile - it differs not one whit from standard ANC fare. 
A sample, extracted from an article headed ‘Zuma praises Manuel’, by 
Michael Hamlyn in Fin24 on 21st December 2007, reads as follows: 
 
Asked more specifically about economic policy, in particular about 
social spending, Zuma said he was sure that this was an issue that the 
government will continually address. 
 
But he suggested that the real issue that needs solving is what to do 
about people who are dependent on social payments. He wanted to see 
action taken so that people would be able to work their way out of 
such dependency. 
 
“The problem is that a large proportion of the unemployed are 
unemployable”, he said. 
 
He suggested that what is needed is a programme of education. “It is a 
big issue that needs government to look at,” he said. (downloaded 
from 
http://www.fin24.co.za/articles/default/display_article.aspx?ArticleId=
1518-25_2242093) 
 
In an article headed ‘Zuma’s victory may trigger the break-up of the 
ANC’, William Gumede, author of the work Thabo Mbeki and the Battle 
for the Soul of the ANC, offered the following analysis: 
 
For all the doubts that hang over Zuma's character, many argue that he 
offers a critical conduit for the poor's grievances. These people are 
going to be disappointed. (Guardian Unlimited, Wednesday December 
19, 2007) 
 
In short, not only does Zuma lack the political muscle to tackle poverty in 
a meaningful way, he also has no idea of how this might be done. For 
someone who occupied high office for years, with the duty that entails for 
thinking about these matters, such a performance is singularly 
unimpressive. As with Mbeki, though, so too with Zuma - there is little 
point in blaming him for these inadequacies - the fault lies not with the 
individual, but rather with the elite of the political party he heads. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
Poverty estimates are intensely political - they need to be handled with 
care. Two sets of van der Berg et al figures, the 2005 and the 2007b, 
have, by assiduous promotion, become the received wisdom.30 despite 
their differences, both sets have been embraced with enthusiasm by 
government. The 2005 figures were attractive because they registered an 
impressive decline in the headcount between 2000 and 2004.31 Hovering 
in the wings are the van der Berg et al 2007a results, which could become 
the new received wisdom. The headcount ratios published in the Mid-
Term Review, as I have shown, have already given rise to confusion, and 
look set to continue doing so, unless users are taught what they actually 
mean. They can quite legitimately be used to show that at least in income 
poverty terms, ‘the masses’ were better off in 1993 than they were in 
2006. What virtue there is in the publication of such potentially 
misleading results, I have yet to discover. 
 
Household survey data in South Africa are not of such a quality that 
reliable estimates of poverty, past and present, may be made. Under these 
circumstances, any estimate that is published is likely to be contested. 
The question then arises, from the point of view of the poor, what kind of 
estimate has the greatest capacity to do harm: an over-estimate or an 
under-estimate of the severity of the problem? An over-estimate might 
please arch-conservatives. Racists, whose prejudices are unlikely to 
require external confirmation, and for whom schadenfreude may be a way 
of life, will welcome bad news. Racists are an unpleasant residue, but 
probably not one with a great deal of power to influence the course of 
events. Some investors could be sensitive to exaggerated estimates of the 
number of destitute - if investment is harmed, that would affect the poor. 
So too, would political change to an unstable or fiscally irresponsible 
regime. Thrown up by the Race Relations intervention, these are 
questions that need to be addressed. 
 
An under-estimate of the severity of poverty (or an over-estimate of the 
progress made in the struggle against poverty), by contrast, if it persuades 
government that its anti-poverty policies are more successful than a ‘true’ 
estimate would make them believe, has the potential to do a great deal of 
harm to the poor. In a matter as grave as this, erring on the side of 
caution, i.e., accepting that the less optimistic estimates of poverty that 
exist have a reasonable probability of being correct, would seem to be the 
right thing to do. 
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Unlikely the Race Relations figures may be, impossible they are not. To 
approach them using terms like ‘falsification of reality’ (the President) or 
‘ulterior motives’ (Joel Netshitenzhe) is not a useful way of doing so. 
While not as inappropriate as Rush Limbaugh’s response to the Race 
Relations figures, the President’s (and Joel Netshitenzhe’s) remarks make 
little contribution to the debate. Limbaugh’s rabid ravings can safely be 
ignored - the statesmanlike thing for our President to have done under the 
circumstances would have been to have engaged critically with the 
substance of the Race Relations numbers. Quoting fragile poverty 
estimates, as he did in his letter, does not alter the possibility that lurking 
at the bottom of South Africa’s income distribution, is some large number 
of destitute people. That possibility needs to be considered, not brushed 
aside as a ‘falsification of reality’. 
 
For many, it will be impossible to admit that Race Relation’s stirring up 
of a hornet’s nest over the poverty question, has (inadvertently?) been of 
service to the country. For myself, I owe a debt of gratitude to the 
Institute for helping me to uncover the confusion related in the pages 
above. This does not mean that their $/day poverty estimates are 
acceptable - they are not - the figures cannot even be sensibly commented 
on until such time as Race Relations exposes their workmanship to the 
scrutiny of the academic community. It is time for them to drag 
themselves into the era of free exchange of information. 
 
Finally, serious self-interrogation of ANC policy on poverty and what 
might be done to improve it, is long overdue. If it is to provide any useful 
insights, such an auto-critique (as we used to call it in the old days) must 
include an examination of the processes by which the ‘values’ the ANC 
proclaims about poverty came to be established. In the euphoria that 
Zuma’s triumph has created among his supporters, little consideration 
seems to have been given to ways in which that victory strengthens (or 
weakens) the hand of those who seek to improve the conditions of the 
poor. Although occasional voices from the left may be heard expressing 
concern about Zuma’s credentials, it is the process of policy formation 
within the ANC itself, that should be attracting attention. The scope for 
rational debate in a climate dominated by a paternalistic elite is, however, 
limited, a condition exacerbated by the hawks of capitalism hovering 
above any politician unwise enough to challenge the ‘logic’ of the 
market. This does not bode well for the poor. 
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 ENDNOTES 
 
1. Other commentators on the matter also use the van der Berg et al 
figures in their rebuttals of the Race Relations figures. One 
example is to be found in the opinion piece by Miriam Altman that 
ran under the headline ‘Poverty shock! (Never mind the facts)’ in 
the ‘Comment and Analysis’ section of the Mail & Guardian 
online version, dated 27th November 2007 (downloaded on 29th 
November 2007). Altman’s piece ends thus: 
 ‘The SAIRR has issued a report meant to highlight business and 
employment trends, but has relied on someone else’s conclusions. 
It seems satisfied to issue dramatic statements without checking 
official sources or easily accessible analysis. 
 The poverty debate cannot rely on such shoddy work. A major 
news agency called me last week to ask for comment on the 
SAIRR report. I quoted the AMPS data showing how the poorest 
income groups got smaller in the past six years. They ran the story 
anyway as reported by SAIRR, taking a quote from one of my 
papers out of context to support this report. 
 The real problem of poverty is big enough. It is not helped by 
arbitrary inflation, sloppy research and poorly researched 
journalism.’ 
 This elicited a rejoinder from Tim Bester, posted on the Business 
Day web on 29th November 2007, under the heading ‘The pitfalls 
of poverty measures’. He subjects the SAARF figures (South 
African Advertising Research Foundation, from whence come the 
AMPS data that are the source of the van der Berg et al poverty 
estimates), to scrutiny, and finds them wanting. Chiding all and 
sundry who make uncritical use of SAARF data, especially their 
LSM estimates (the Living Standards Measure is a marketing 
research tool), he responds to her contribution thus: 
 ‘Altman exhorts the SAIRR to check “official sources” or “easily 
accessible analysis”. She should heed her own advice and check 
her own sources.’ 
 
2. From number 1 in 2002, Minister Manuel slithered to number 57 in 
2007. 
 
3. The DPRU stuff is more even-handed than that coming out of 
Stellenbosch. A piece I wrote, which was published by the DPRU, 
criticises government’s use of research results, noting that: 
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 ‘Netshitenzhe mines Bhorat et al piece for the most spectacular-
sounding achievements in the asset provision field. He fails to 
mention their finding that asset poverty reduction appears to have 
been more rapid between 1993 and 1999 than it was between 1999 
and 2004. Nor does he mention their conclusion that the relative 
headcount reduction in the bottom decile was much lower than that 
higher up the distribution (2006, p.33). Netshitenzhe also does not 
draw the reader’s attention to the continuing ‘marginalisation of 
poor African women living in rural areas’ where Bhorat et al 
discover the asset poverty headcount rates in 2004 to have been 
above those in 1993 (2006, p.31).’ (Meth, 2007a, p.9n) 
 The paper by Pauw and Mncube (2007), by contrast, also out of the 
DPRU, is depressingly uncritical in its assessment of the potential 
for expanding the social grant system, failing even to mention, let 
alone consider, the possibility of changes to the tax structure to 
finance grants. 
 
4. Detailed page references to all citations from the work by van der 
Berg et al are given below. 
 
5. From approximately 40.6 million in 1996 to about 47.4 million in 
2006. 
 
6. When, on 28th October 2007, the Independent group of newspapers 
online version (www.iol.co.za) ran a story, picked up from Sapa, 
with the unfortunate headline ‘Workers better off under apartheid - 
Vavi’, I remember thinking: ‘no whitey could get away with that in 
public.’ What Vavi is actually reported as saying was that the 
‘[u]nemployed and casual workers were better off under the 
apartheid government than they are now’, a debatable, but slightly 
less startling claim. 
 
7. Downloaded from http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site 
111307/content/01125104.guest.html, 25th November 2007. This 
appeared as Story #6 on 13th November 2007, under the headline 
‘Poverty Has Doubled in South Africa after Apartheid‘. 
 
8. Downloaded from BBC website 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7091231.stm, 25th November 
2007. The article was run on Monday, 12th November 2007. 
 
9. The Race Relations figures refer only to those at the very bottom of 
the heap, pers comm. Marco MacFarlane, SA Institute of Race 
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Relations, 25th November 2007. The Race Relations ‘Website 
Comment’ of 16th November 2007 headed ‘The truth has 
prevailed’, a wordplay on the headline over President Mbeki’s 
article ‘The truth will prevail!’, refers specifically to progress 
allegedly made in the struggle against poverty, citing unadjusted 
headcount ratios from the Mid-Term Review. 
 
10. These figures are referred to in the Race Relations ‘Website 
Comment’ of 16th November 2007. 
 
11. The source cited in the Review is van der Berg et al, 2006 (PCAS, 
2007, p.25). No bibliographic details are provided, so I have not 
been able to locate that particular paper. The only 2006 paper I can 
find by van der Berg et al is a slightly revised version of their 2005 
effort. This latter 2006 paper (referred to below as van der Berg et 
al, 2006) removes an obviously incorrect set of estimates of 
poverty at a R3371 per capita per annum poverty line, and replaces 
them with figures that, if not correct, are at least consistent. 
 
12. The 2007b paper, published under the aegis of the Economics 
Department in Stellenbosch University, does not appear on the 
Department’s list of publications. I picked it up, after being tipped 
off by Macfarlane, on the SARPN website (www.sarpn.org.za). 
 
13. The van der Berg et al 2005 paper, and an early version what 
became my 2006a paper, referred to below, were presented for 
critical evaluation at a workshop hosted by the HSRC in February 
2006. Present among the participants were Dr Vusi Gumede and 
Mr Alan Hirsch, from the Presidency. Neither paper found favour 
with the audience. My 2006a paper, some of whose results are 
presented below, incorporates most of the criticisms made by 
participants at that seminar. 
 
14. I downloaded it from the Stellenbosch site on 13th June 2007. 
 
15. Dr Gumede is to be criticised for attempting to demonstrate that 
‘the proportion in poverty had fallen’ by presenting headcounts for 
two separate years. 
 
16. The presentation of the Review results in this form was suggested 
by a comment in the Race Relations ‘Website Comment’ of 16th 
November 2007 headed ‘The truth has prevailed’. Here it is: ‘The 
President also accuses the Institute of ignoring data from his own 
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office’s Mid Term Review which shows that levels of poverty 
measured at R3000/year are declining. The Institute did in fact, in 
September, publish that data in its monthly Fast Facts publication. 
The President is correct that this shows a fall in the proportion of 
people living in poverty from 50.1 percent in 1993 to 43.2 percent 
in 2006. But the actual number in 2006 – nearly 20.5 million – is 
nearly four times the figure given by the Institute (for 1995)!’ Here, 
Race Relations is taking the poverty rates at face value, with 
precisely the sort of outcome against which I warn above. 
 
17. They should also warn readers against drawing similarly ‘incorrect’ 
conclusions from the van der Berg et al 2007b paper, whose 
explanatory notes are not much better. 
 
18. My estimate of the headcount reduction, as noted above, is roughly 
the same as the change suggested by their 2007b figures. The data I 
used do not allow an estimate for 2000 to be made. Since the van 
der Berg et al results have poverty rising over the year 2000-2001, 
the fact that I cannot estimate poverty levels in the year 2000, is not 
a problem. Their 2007a paper says that the headcount rate went 
from 36.43 per cent in 2000 to 34.62 per cent in 2001, while the 
headcount rose from 16 287 231 to 16 544 280 (Appendix, Table 
A1, p.31). The precision of their estimates is spurious. 
 
19. Among the many sources of primary data used by van der Berg et 
al, are income figures from the AMPS (All Media and Products 
Study) surveys. My results rely on a combination of Statistics 
South Africa’s Labour Force Survey and General Household 
Survey data for 2004 and 2005. 
 
20. In addition to under-reporting errors, surveys (and censuses) are 
plagued by the problem of zero-income responses. There are 
various ways of addressing this problem, none of which is wholly 
satisfactory. To deal with zero-incomes, I have imputed income 
from survey estimates of total household expenditure. The surveys 
on which van der Berg et al rely, require the enumerator to 
estimate household income where respondents, for whatever 
reason, do not answer the income questions. 
 
21. It would be a great boon to readers if the authors spelled out in 
some detail, and right at the beginning of the paper, the reasons 
why the 2005 and 2007a figures differ so markedly. 
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22. An article by Joel Netshitenzhe, head of the PCAS, posted to the 
Business Day web on 27th November 2007, under the headline 
‘Telling neglect in race institute’s poverty study’, listed the sources 
Race Relations could have used to chart the course of poverty. 
Ending the article with a not unreasonable comment about the way 
the Race Relations figures were published, he says: 
 ‘On a matter as critical as poverty reduction, one would have 
expected at least a rigorous process of peer review and broader 
consultation before publication.’ 
 Then he lapses into paranoid-sounding speculation by saying: 
 ‘That the SAIRR avoided this critical part of research methodology 
raises the critical question: was there no ulterior motive behind its 
study?’ 
 
23. Numbered amongst these measures must be reliable estimates of 
the extent of income poverty (making due allowance for the so-
called ‘social wage’). 
 
24. The spreading of alarm and despondency, especially in wartime, is 
always frowned upon by those in power. The response of the 
British government to bad news during World War 1, is typical: 
 “In the UK the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) of August 1914 
ensured government control over information, the penalty for 
spreading uncensored information being imprisonment. The War 
Office Press Bureau was established in 1914 to control news about 
the war, along with the War Propaganda Bureau to produce 
positive posters and pamphlets. Letters home were heavily 
censored; eventually soldiers were provided with pre-printed 
postcards containing positive statements to tick and sign, allowing 
no indication of the terrible casualties and conditions on the 
Western Front.” 
 Many more examples of this sort can be found. Downloaded on 3rd 
December 2007, from 
http://www.helicon.co.uk/online/datasets/samples/encyclopedia/ran
king.htm 
 
25. The response to the Minister of Social Development’s comments 
(made in November 2006) on the need for a basic income grant is 
discussed below. 
 
26. Someone else who said that ‘economic policy, including inflation 
targeting, was unlikely to change even if there was a change of 
leadership’, was Tito Mboweni, governor of the Reserve Bank. He 
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was responding to a statement by Zuma that inflation targeting, 
whose removal is demanded by the union movement, ‘… is 
something I am going to get into’ (see the article ‘Zuma ‘to look at 
inflation targets’ ’, posted to the Business Day online version, 24th 
December 2007). It should not be too long before self-appointed 
defenders of the Bank’s autonomy, meant to protect it against 
populist interference, spring to its defence. 
 
27. The passage in the article in questions claims that on the issue of a 
basic income grant, the Minister is quoted as saying that: ‘I 
personally believe -- and it's not an African National Congress 
position -- that we do need something like that.’ 
 The government would be unable to reach the poorest of the poor 
and eradicate unemployment within the next ten years, the minister 
said. Unemployment, and accordingly the country’s social 
problems, would skyrocket if a grant was not introduced.’ 
 
28. I have tackled, on a number of occasions, the question of whether 
or not the ‘halving unemployment’ goal is realistic (see, in 
particular, Meth, 2006b). The exaggeration of employment growth 
by senior politicians has also come in for scrutiny (Meth, 2007 and 
2008). 
 
29. The question of whether or not the process that led to the adoption 
by government of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
Strategy in 1996, was democratic, is hotly contested. Spirited 
rejections of the label ‘neo-liberal’, which critics of GEAR apply to 
the most senior political figures, abound ― see, for example, 
“Letter from the President”, in ANC Today, 7(42), 26 October-1 
November 2007, or the article by the Minister of Finance headed 
“Gear definitely not a capitalist plot”, in The Times, online version, 
December 12, 2007. The latter contains a detailed account of the 
events prior to GEAR’s tabling in Parliament. How significant the 
consultations were to which the Minister refers, is not agreed.  
Ebrahim Khalil-Hassen suggests that these meetings “could be seen 
as a rubber-stamping process” (Thought Leader, Mail & Guardian, 
online version, 18th December 2007). Crucial to the debate is the 
extent to which there was space, prior to its adoption, to negotiate 
not only over the merits of GEAR, but also whether or not such a 
policy should be adopted. Writing in Southern Africa Report, 
Lehulere’s (1998) view was that: “When GEAR was adopted, the 
ANC as an organization was presented with a fait accompli by the 
ANC cabinet. Indeed, the ANC's highest decision-making body 
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was only convened to endorse GEAR after the government had 
announced its adoption.”  In similar vein to Lehulere, Padayachee 
(2006, p.1) writes that: “The RDP was (and occasionally still is) 
trotted out as representing the real development agenda of the ANC 
alliance, but the new ANC-led government quickly moved to 
consolidate its economic strategy in the form of the Growth 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) plan, which was put 
together by a team of mostly white, male economists, and 
announced to the world as ‘non-negotiable’.” The political climate 
in the period leading up to the adoption of GEAR is discussed in 
Saul, 2005, pp.204ff. If GEAR, from the outset, a set of policies 
conceived by an elite group, really was ‘non-negotiable’ then any 
subsequent endorsement by ANC party structures needs to be 
subjected to close critical scrutiny. The comments by Dunn (2000), 
cited above, on the tensions within democracies caused by 
‘aristocratic elements’, assume obvious significance in complex 
debates of this sort.In the same issue of the Southern Africa Report 
in which the Lehulere piece appeared, there is an article by Tom 
Lodge describing events at the 50th Conference of the ANC at 
Mafikeng, which led to the endorsement of GEAR. 
 
30. References to the van der Berg et al findings abound (ask Google!). 
Apart from the Race Relations reproduction of their results referred 
to above, another recent example of the use of the 2007b figures 
may be found in an article with the title ‘The politics of 
redistribution’, by Ebrahim-Khalil Hassen, in the ‘Comment and 
Analysis’ section of the Mail and Guardian online on 18th 
November 2007. In an otherwise thoughtful and insightful piece, 
the author asserts, without citing a source, that: ‘Poverty has fallen 
from 50,8 percent in 2000 to 43,2 percent in 2006.’ The source is, 
of course, van der Berg et al, via the Mid-Term Review (PCAS, 
2007, p.25). 
 
31. The 2005 figures were used by President Mbeki in a reply to 
Parliamentary Questions on 20th March 2006, and by Joel 
Netshitenzhe in his dispute with John Pilger. See the article ‘Voters 
do not share Pilger’s perception’ in the Sunday Independent, 
August 20 2006. 
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